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Abstract 
This paper investigates long-term returns from unemployment compensation, exploiting 
variation from the UK JSA reform of 1996, which implied a major increase in job search 
requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle. Search theory predicts 
that such changes should raise the proportion of non-claimant nonemployed, with 
consequences on search effort and labor market attachment, and lower the reservation wage 
of the unemployed, with negative effects on post-unemployment wages. I test these ideas on 
longitudinal data from Social Security records (LLMDB). Using a difference in differences 
approach, I find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after JSA 
introduction, as opposed to six months earlier, are 2.5-3% more likely to move from 
unemployment into Incapacity Benefits spells, and 4% less likely to have positive earnings in 
the following year. This latter employment effect only vanishes four years after the initial 
unemployment shock. At the same time, earnings for the treated individuals seem to be lower 
than for the non treated, but the confidence intervals around these estimated effects are quite 
large to exclude a wider variety of scenarios. These results suggest that while tighter search 
requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment benefits, they were 
not successful in moving them onto new or better jobs, with fairly long lasting unintended 
consequences on a number of labor market outcomes. 
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1 Introduction
Despite a substantial literature on the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on the duration of
unemployment and re-employment rates,1 less is known on its long-term eﬀects on work careers,
starting with the first job following an unemployment spell. But the channels through which UI
aﬀects the process of return to work, mainly job search eﬀort and reservation wages, are clearly
also likely to have an impact on the quality of post-unemployment jobs and in general on future
work careers. For example it may be argued that more generous UI gives workers the opportunity
of not simply accepting the first job oﬀer that comes along, but of waiting for a good job, that
provides the best match for their skills. Indeed the theoretical literature contains a number of
papers pointing out that UI may have beneficial eﬀects, mainly by encouraging workers to wait
for high-productivity jobs in an environment with search frictions and heterogeneous jobs.2
This paper provides new evidence on the long-term returns from UI, exploiting variation from
the UK Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) reform of 1996. The JSA was introduced in October 1996
to replace the previous Unemployment Benefit/Income Support system. This was a major reform
to the UK system of welfare benefits for the unemployed, and it was generally perceived as a
toughening of the unemployment compensation regime. Indeed, one of the most important changes
with respect to the previous system was a substantial rise in search requirements for eligibility and
in the related administrative hurdle. There is now broad consensus on the strong positive eﬀects
of the JSA on the claimant outflow rate. In particular, the months following JSA introduction
coincided with a record fall in the number of unemployment benefit claimants.
In this paper I explore the link between tighter search requirements and a number of post-
unemployment outcomes, including future employment rates, weeks worked, earnings and new
benefit spells. The impact of higher search requirements on average search intensity is theoreti-
cally ambiguous, as some will search more intensively to meet the requirements, while others may
consider the requirements too burdensome and give up search (see Manning, 2005), with an am-
biguous impact on the exit rate into new jobs. But the introduction of stricter eligibility criteria
unambiguosly reduces utility during job search, with negative eﬀects on reservation wages and
post-unemployment wages, and raises the share of non-claimants in the nonemployment stock,
thus possibly raising the take-up rate of other kinds of benefits.
I use a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach to estimate the eﬀects of unemployment compensation
on subsequent careers. I compare long-term outcomes for cohorts of unemployment entrants before
and after JSA introduction in October 1996. As these two cohorts may diﬀer in seasonal factors,
1See, among others, Atkinson and Mickewright (1991) and Meyer (1995) for extensive surveys of nonexperimental
and experimental studies, respectievely, and Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller (2007) for more recent evidence.
2See Diamond (1981), Acemoglu (2001), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000), and Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
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I construct similar reference cohorts for 1997, and then look at diﬀerence in diﬀerences across
cohorts and years.
There is an aspect of the JSA rules that makes this procedure non-standard, namely that when
the JSA was introduced, the new eligibility requirements applied not only to the new claimant
inflow, but to the existing stock of unemployed claimants as well, so there is no major discontinuity
to expect between labor market outcomes of workers who became unemployed just before and just
after JSA introduction. But the distance between the start date of an unemployment claimant
spell and the date of JSA introduction is indicative of the spell’s probability of being treated, and
this will be the basis of my identification. I include in my treatment group all spells started in the
three months after JSA introduction, for which treatment probability is equal to one, and in the
control group all spells started six to three months before JSA introduction, for which treatment
probability is positive but strictly less than one, as some of them may have ended before being
subject to JSA rules. Using control and treatment groups defined this way poses a number of
issues and requires robustness tests that will be dealt with in detail below.
My empirical analysis leads to three main findings. First, JSA has had a strong, positive and
significant impact on the outflow from claimant benefits for the individuals aﬀected, but a null
or even negative impact on weeks worked one year later. While the reform successfully managed
to move claimants oﬀ benefits, it had a much more limited impact in getting them onto new,
lasting jobs. Second, I find that JSA has had a negative and significant impact on the probability
of positive earnings in the years following an unemployment shock. This eﬀect is about 4% in
the first year, and is gradually reabsorbed in the next three years. Post-unemployment annual
and weekly earnings (conditional on employment) also seem to be somewhat reduced by the JSA,
but the corresponding eﬀects are often do not reach standard significance levels. Third, while
JSA has moved individuals oﬀ unemployment-related benefits, it has increased the incidence of
other benefits, most notably incapacity benefits. Starting a spell soon after JSA introduction,
as opposed to six months earlier, implies an increase of 2.5-3% in the probability of claiming
incapacity benefits six months after unemployment exit.
The related literature contains a number of papers that look at diﬀerent aspects of the rela-
tionship between the generosity of unemployment compensation and subsequent earnings and job
stability. This literature started in the 1970s with studies that exploited individual variation in UI
replacement ratios in order to study the impact of UI generosity on post-unemployment wages (see
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Burgess and Kingston, 1976; Holen, 1977; and Classen, 1977), and
contains some recent contributions that use quasi-experimental evidence to quantify its impact on
both post-unemployment earnings and job stability (see, among others, Card, Chetty and Weber,
2007, and Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). The majority of studies in this literature tend to find
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zero or very modest eﬀects of UI generosity on the quality of post-unemployment jobs, across a
variety of institutional backgrounds and econometric methods.3
My work complements existing evidence on post-unemployment impact of UI with three main
contributions. First, I use social security data containing complete labor market histories, which
provide a more long-term perspective on the impact of UI than previously addressed in the liter-
ature. The large sample size of the data used also allows me identify the eﬀects of interest using
narrowly defined cohorts of unemployment entrants and to test for anticipation eﬀects of the JSA.
Second, UI systems have several institutional features, and I estimate the eﬀects of major changes
in job search requirements, while most of the previous literature focused on the eﬀects of either
changes in UI benefit levels or in their maximum duration. As it will be illustrated below, an
increase in search requirements is predicted to lower reservation wages even when the actual level
of benefits received remains unchanged. Third, I consider a new potential dimension of the long-
term eﬀects of UI, namely the start of other benefit spells. This completes the picture of what
happens beyond the current unemployment spell, and has consequences for the impact of JSA on
total benefit expenditure.
The paper is organized as follows. The next session discussed related work. Section 3 describes
the JSA features that are going to be relevant in my analysis. Section 4 proposes a simple job
search model to represent the likely eﬀects of JSA. Section 5 describes the data set used. Section
6 presents my methodology and some preliminary evidence. Section 7 presents my findings on the
eﬀect of JSA on a number of post-unemployment outcomes. Section 8 finally concludes.
2 Related work
This work is related to two main strands of literature on welfare reforms, namely the large existing
literature on the impact of tighter job search requirements for UI eligibility, and the much less
abundant literature on the long-term eﬀects of UI generosity.
Evidence on the impact of job search requirements on the time spent of benefits is relevant
to the analysis of the paper, as this would naturally represent a kind of first stage for more long-
term eﬀects of UI. For instance, if time on benefits did not respond to the tightening of search
requirements, it would be hard to expect much eﬀect of this on the quality of post-unemployment
jobs. There now exists a large body of experimental work on the eﬀects of increased enforcement
of search requirements, based on a number of US social experiments carried out in the late 1970s
and 1980s. Meyer (1995) provides an extensive survey and evaluation of these experiments, and
finds that the adopted combinations of search requirements and assistance was largely successful
3Exceptions are Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, (1976), Burgess and Kingston (1976), Holen, (1977) and Centeno (2004).
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in reducing the number of weeks on benefits. At the same time, the impact on weeks worked
tends to be less clear-cut, quantitatively weaker and often imprecisely estimated, suggesting that
not all transitions oﬀ benefits represents new hires. More closely related to this paper, Johnson
and Klepinger (1994) find that job seekers assigned to a standard search requirements treatment
spend on average shorter time on UI benefits and earn about 3% less in the first quarter following
UI than a control group with no search requirements at all.4
For the UK there has been a randomized experiment in 1986, the so-called Restart Programme,
which randomly assigned claimants who had spent twelve months of benefits (later reduced to six)
to treatment consisting in counseling and tighter enforcement of eligibility requirements, and was
essentially a precursor to the JSA. The Restart seems to have significantly increased the exit rate
from unemployment (Dolton and O’Neill, 1996) and to have had beneficial long-term employment
eﬀects for men treated, though not for women (Dolton and O’Neill, 2002).
A UK-based study of JSA may contribute to the evidence provided by the mostly US-based
experimental studies in a number of ways. First, it seems that the JSA had a stronger bite on the
claimant unemployment outflow than most US experiments, and thus one may expect that findings
from the US social experiments may not necessarily generalize to other scenarios. Second, most
US experiments involve combinations of search requirements and counselling services, and it may
be diﬃcult to determine the relative merits of diﬀerent measures. Finally, the use of social security
data in the evaluation of the JSA provides a more long-term perspective on the impact of UI rules
and on a wider variety of outcome measures than typically studied in existing experiments.
The existing literature on the impact of the generosity of UI on post-unemployment outcomes
is not as large and less conclusive. Early studies from the 1970s tend to identify the eﬀect of UI on
post-unemployment earnings by exploiting individual variation in the replacement ratio. Among
these, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) look at the eﬀect of the UI replacement ratio on the change
in earnings before and after unemployment using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey,
and find that a 25% increase in the replacement ratio yields a 7% increase in post-unemployment
wages for older men, with lower or non significant eﬀects for other demographic groups. Burgess
and Kingston (1976) and Holen (1977) follow a similar approach on Service to Claimants data,
and estimate that an extra dollar in weekly benefits raises post-unemployment annual earnings
by 25 and 36 dollars, respectively. In contrast, Classen (1977) finds no significant eﬀect of UI on
earnings using data on claimants from the Continuous Wage and Benefit History.
It can be argued that exploiting individual variation in the replacement ratio is not ideal as
this may be correlated with some unobserved individual characteristics, and Cox and Oaxaca
4More recent evaluations of US randomized experiments tend to find negative eﬀects of tighter search require-
ments on UI duration (see for example Klepinger et al., 1997), although in some cases the estimated eﬀect is at
most quite small (Ashenfelter et al., 1999). See also the recent survey by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006).
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(1990) who review this literature tend to dismiss positive findings, and conclude that “one can
find no compelling evidence in support of the proposition that UI increases wages because of better
matches and increased job stability” (p. 236).
Related studies in the more recent literature are sparse, and tend to conclude that the earnings
eﬀects of UI are non-significant or at best very modest. Addison, McKinley and Blackburn (2000)
use data from Displaced Worker Surveys and only find (weak) evidence of a favorable impact of UI
on post-unemployment earnings when comparing recipients and non-recipients, and even in this
case the estimates obtained are substantially smaller than those obtained by earlier studies who
found evidence of positive eﬀects. Belzil (2001) and Juraida (2002) look at post-unemployment
job duration as a measure of job quality using cohorts of Canadian and US displaced workers
respectively. While Belzil finds no causal impact of UI benefit duration on post-unemployment
job duration, Juraida finds that UI eligibility actually increases the probability of future layoﬀs.
Card et al. (2007) exploit discontinuities in severance payments and UI benefit entitlement in
Austria, based on previous employment history, and find no beneficial eﬀects of either transfer
on post-unemployment earnings or job stability. Similar results are obtained by Van Ours and
Vodopivec (2006), who exploit the change introduced by a Slovenian UI reform that substantially
reduced the potential benefit duration. Finally, Paserman (2007) estimates a structural job search
model, and finds that changes in the level of benefits have negligible impact on re-employment
wages, and only aﬀect job finding rates via search intensity.
While the driving variation analyzed by all papers in this literature consists of changes on the
level and/or in the potential duration of benefits, I will mostly study the impact of changes in job
search requirements, as implied by the JSA reform. As shown in Section 3, these requirements can
have an eﬀect on the workers’ reservation wages even when the actual level of benefit perceived
remains unchanged. Moreover, a tightening of search requirements may raise the number of
claimants who leave unemployment without finding a job, and such transitions into “non-claimant”
nonemployment may have more severe consequences on re-employment outcomes, as they typically
imply stronger detachment from the labor market than claimant nonemployment.
3 The UK Jobseeker’s Allowance
The JSA was introduced on 7 October 1996 in order to replace the existing system of Unemploy-
ment Benefits (UB) and Income Support (IS). UB represented unemployment insurance, was based
on previous social security contributions, and was not means tested. IS was an unemployment
assistance scheme that was means tested. The JSA has a contributory component (contJSA),
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which replaced UB, and a means tested component (incJSA), which replaced IS.5
In both the old and the new regime the means-tested component of unemployment compen-
sation was much more important than the contributory component, simply because the majority
of unemployment claimants have insuﬃcient social security contributions to be eligible for UB or
contJSA, whether at all or in its full duration. For example, only 15% of the ongoing claimant
unemployment spells in April 1996 were covered by UB. In my data I cannot distinguish between
contJSA and incJSA, but Manning (2005) computes on Labour Force Survey data that in February
1997 again 15% of JSA recipients were receiving contJSA.
The features of JSA that are relevant for this study are the changes introduced with respect
to the previous UB/IS system, and the transitional arrangements for individuals receiving either
UB or IS when JSA came into action.6 JSA introduction implied some changes in the duration
and level of benefits. UB had a maximum entitlement period of 12 months, and this was halved
to 6 months under JSA. In 1996 UB was £48.25 per week for single persons, with a £29.75 adult
dependant supplement, while IS was £47.90 for single persons aged 25+, £37.90 for single persons
aged 18-24,7 and £75.20 for couples in which at least one spouse was aged 18+. Thus UB and IS
payments were very similar except for young people, who received about 20% less under IS than
UB. When JSA was introduced it was initially payable at exactly the same rates and conditions
as IS. Thus the only category who would see their benefits cut in the new JSA regime consists
on youths who were eligible for UB under the old regime. But because the proportion of UB
recipients was low, this change had an arguably limited impact. Nevertheless, most of the results
below are presented separately for the 16-24 and the 25-64 year old groups.
The most significant break with respect to the previous UB/IS regime was represented by the
substantial increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative
hurdle. Claimants have to sign a Jobseeker’s Agreement in which they agree to actively seek work
and commit to a number of specific search steps in order to find work, like how may employers at
least they are going to contact every week, or how many times at least they are going to contact
a Jobcentre. They are required to keep a detailed diary of search steps undertaken, such as each
phone call made to a potential employer. The search diary is then checked against the initial
agreement at fortnightly interviews with the Employment Service, or more often if a claimant is
suspected of fraud. Claimants may be “directed” by the Employment Service staﬀ to take specific
steps, and if a claimant is still unemployed after 13 weeks, he is required to broaden his search
5After JSA introduction there is still a benefit called IS, but it is not job-search related, and provides means-
tested welfare to selected demographic groups, most notably lone parents and carers of dependants with disabilities.
6A very detailed description of institutional and administrative aspects of the JSA is contained in the Jobseeker’s
Handbook by Pointer and Barnes (1997). The pre-existing UB/IS system is covered by Finn et al. (1996).
716 and 17 year olds were also eligible for the £37.90 IS rate if living away from their parents or qualified for a
disability premium; otherwise were entitled to a £28.85 reduced rate.
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and may not turn down job oﬀers outside his main occupation (although it can be argued that
these measures are hardly enforceable, in so far one has control on job oﬀers received). Failure to
meet the above requirements is threatened with temporary sanctions or disqualification.
Although the new JSA rules fit in a trend of tighter eligibility for unemployment compensation,
started in 1986 with the Restart Programme for those unemployed longer than twelve months,
JSA introduction represented a marked change in entitlement rules and in required interaction
with the Employment Service.
As this work is mostly going to focus on cohorts of unemployment entrants during the year of
JSA introduction, transitional arrangements from the UB/IS system to the JSA are going to play
an important role in my choice of methodology. During the pre-JSA period, all UB spells started
on or before 8 April 1996 and before 7 October 1996 had a maximum 6 (instead of 12) months
entitlement at the UB rate. More importantly, all existing UB and IS spells as of 7 October
1996 are transferred to the JSA system, and claimants had to fill a Jobseeker’s Agreement soon
after 7 October, and “were treated as having made a Jobseekers’ Agreement until the date in
which an actual Agreement is made” (Finn, Murray and Donnelly, 1996, p.64), using information
provided in their initial UB or IS form. The retroactive applicability of JSA was very much in the
spirit to sanction “those who were not previously assiduous in their job search or were claiming
fraudulently” (Rayner et al, 2000, p1).
The JSA has been generally perceived as a major reform of the UK welfare system for the
unemployed, and some of its eﬀects can be easily grasped by looking at time series of seasonally
adjusted flows in and out of registered unemployment, shown in Figure 1. Soon after JSA in-
troduction, there was a marked increase in the claimant outflow, with little or no impact on the
inflow into the claimant register. As Figure 2 shows, this translated into a more rapid decline in
the unemployment stock, which was already falling in the months preceding the reform. Indeed
oﬃcial evaluations of the JSA carried by the then Department of Social Security (now Department
for Work and Pension) agree in documenting a very strong impact of the JSA on the flow oﬀ the
unemployment claimant register8. More recently, McVicar (2006) studies a case of excused signing
(and thus zero monitoring of search eﬀort) within the JSA, during refurbishment of benefit oﬃces
in Northern Ireland. He finds that periods with no monitoring strongly reduce the exit rate from
benefits. However, optimistic conclusions on job search and employment eﬀects of search moni-
toring do not seem to be granted. Manning (2005) finds in fact that the JSA did not result in an
overall increase in job search eﬀort, nor in higher job-finding rates. The next section illustrates
how these developments may in turn result in lower post-unemployment earnings and/or higher
labor force exits.
8See for example Rayner et al. (2000) and Smith et al. (2000).
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4 A simple job search model
A simple job search model is a useful framework to illustrate the likely impact of higher job search
requirements on post-unemployment outcomes. The model is in the wage posting tradition, with
an exogenous wage distribution and endogenous search eﬀort, as in Mortensen (1986). With
respect to Mortensen (1986), I assume that only the unemployed search for jobs, as this is the
key aspect aﬀected by the JSA reform, while employed job search, though empirically important,
would not aﬀect the relevant predictions of the model.
Individuals are infinitely lived, and maximize lifetime utility in continuous time. They can be
either employed or unemployed. When unemployed, they are paid unemployment compensation
b, and spend job search eﬀort s, assuming for the moment that b is not conditional on s. Search
eﬀort in turn costs c(s) and generates job oﬀers at rate λ(s). It is typically assumed that search
costs are convex in eﬀort, while returns are concave, thus c0(s) > 0, c00(s) > 0, λ0(s) > 0, and
λ00(s) < 0. Oﬀers are random draws from an exogenous, known distribution F (w).When employed,
individuals are paid a wage w and face an exogenous risk of job loss δ.
Given this environment, the unemployed pick an optimal job search eﬀort s, and a reservation
wage wR, representing the lowest acceptable wage oﬀer. The flow value of unemployment and
employment can be written as follows, respectively:
rU = max
s,wR
½
b− c(s) + λ(s)
Z
wR
[W (w)− U ] dF (w)
¾
(1)
rW (w) = w + δ[U −W (w)], (2)
where r represents the intertemporal discount rate.
The reservation wage is defined by rW (wR) = rU , i.e. it is the level of the wage that makes
employment equally valuable as unemployment, and given (1) this also implies rU = wR, i.e. the
flow value of unemployment is equal to the reservation wage. Using integration by parts to rewrite
(1), and noting that W 0(w) = 1/(r + δ), the reservation wage is implicitly defined by
wR = rU = max
s
½
b− c(s) + λ(s)
r + δ
Z
wR
[1− F (w)] dw
¾
. (3)
Search eﬀort is set optimally at the level that equates the marginal costs of search with the
marginal benefits, represented by the higher arrival rate of oﬀers, times the associated net gain
with respect to unemployment:
c0(s∗) =
λ0(s∗)
r + δ
Z
wR
[1− F (w)] dw. (4)
The key issue here is how wR and s∗ respond to changes in the institutional environment,
which for the moment is simply summarized into the parameter b. The reservation wage clearly
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increases with wR, as b directly aﬀects unemployment income, which is forgone when one finds a
job. In particular:
dwR
db
= r
dU
db
= 1− λ(s)
r + δ
[1− F (wR)]
dwR
db
(5)
=
r + δ
r + δ + λ(s) [1− F (wR)]
> 0
A rise in b aﬀects s∗ via its eﬀect on wR, and in particular it lowers s∗ because by raising wR
it lowers the net returns to job search. Formally:
ds∗
db
=
λ0(s∗)
R
wR
[1− F (w)] dw
r + δ + λ(s∗) [1− F (wR)]
∙
λ00(s∗)
r + δ
Z
wR
[1− F (w)] dw − c00(s∗)
¸−1
< 0.
The rate at which the unemployed find work is h = λ(s∗)[1 − F (wR)]. Thus a reduction in b
raises the job finding rate via both an increase in job search eﬀort (and thus in the arrival rate of
oﬀers) and a reduction in the reservation wage (and thus a fall in the rejection rate). At the same
time, it lowers the expected post-unemployment wage, E(w|w > wR).
Graphically, this can be seen by drawing indiﬀerence curves in the s, b space (as also done by
Manning, 2005). Utility while unemployed monotonically increases in b, while it increases in s for
s < s∗ and decreases in s for s > s∗:
r
dU
ds
=
r + δ
r + δ + λ(s) [1− F (wR)]
½
λ0(s)
r + δ
Z
wR
[1− F (w)] dw − c0(s)
¾
. (6)
The indiﬀerence curves thus look like those represented in Figure 3, which also depicts the eﬀect
of a fall in b. Higher curves are associated with higher levels of utility.
But as argued above, a change in the level of benefits was probably not the main feature of the
JSA, which instead mostly implied a change in search requirements for eligibility. Imagine now
that unemployment benefits are paid at the full rate for s equal to or higher than some threshold s,
and at some lower rate otherwise. The introduction of JSA implies an increase in such threshold.
Consider an individual who has indiﬀerence curves as those represented in Figure 4. The
increase in requirements from s1 to s2 would raise his optimal search eﬀort from s
∗
1 to the corner
solution s∗2 = s2, and he would move on to a lower indiﬀerence curve, characterized by lower
utility and lower reservation wages. His job finding rate is thus higher, and these are precisely
the “intended” consequences of the JSA. Consider now an individual whose initial search eﬀort
is lower, as illustrated in Figure 5, such that he barely meets the more lenient requirements, i.e.
s∗1 = s1. With the new requirements he would actually reduce his search eﬀort. In other words,
not only would he not meet the new requirements s2, but also it would no longer be worthwhile
for him to keep his search eﬀort as high as s1, thus s
∗
2 < s
∗
1. With lower reservation wages and
10
lower search eﬀort, the eﬀect of the increase in search requirements on the job finding rate of
the unemployed is ambiguous. These are “unintended” consequences of the JSA, emphasized by
Manning (2005) as one of factors why the JSA was not really successful at moving the unemployed
on to new jobs.
This framework delivers two main results that are going to be relevant for the empirical analysis
that follows. First, in any UI regime, workers with s∗ ≥ s are going to be formally classified as UI
claimants, while those with s∗ < s are non-claimants. Thus changes in s aﬀect the composition of
the nonemployed between claimants and non-claimants. To see this, note that changes in s do not
aﬀect optimal search intensity for workers with either very high initial search eﬀort, i.e. s∗1 ≥ s2, or
very low initial search eﬀort, i.e. s∗1 < s1. The former will be UI claimants in both regimes, while
the latter will always be non-claimants. But workers who pick initial search eﬀort in the middle
range s1 ≤ s∗1 < s2 are aﬀected by the change in search requirements. All of them are initially
claiming UI: some of them will find it optimal to search harder when s is raised (as in Figure 4),
and keep claiming UI; while others will reduce search eﬀort (as in Figure 5), and stop claiming UI
in the new regime. This implies that an increase in s will raise the share of non-claimants among
the nonemployed population. They can be either non-claimant unemployed9 or nonparticipants,
and may or may not receive benefits that are not job search related.
Second, whether optimal search eﬀort increases (Figure 4) or decreases (Figure 5), utility
enjoyed when unemployed unambiguously falls as a consequence of an increase in s, and this holds
even when the actual level of benefits received remains unchanged. This happens because some
cash payments that were initially made to the unemployed without too much questioning are now
made conditional on substantial search eﬀort, with some associated costs. Thus one would expect
that an increase in s lowers reservation wages and the quality of post-unemployment jobs.
If on top of higher search requirements, the level of benefits is also falling, as it was the case
for workers aged 18-24 who were receiving UB before JSA introduction, this generates a stronger
fall in the reservation wage (as shown in Figure 3), and lowers the incentive to raise search eﬀort
and meet the higher requirements, thus raising the proportion of workers who reduce search eﬀort
as a consequence of JSA introduction. Thus any fall in the level of benefits would simply reinforce
the eﬀects of tighter search requirements on both post-unemployment wages and outflows into
non-claimant unemployment.
9To fall in this category, a worker may not meet the JSA search requirements but meet instead the ILO
unemployment definition, which classifies as unemployed those who have not worked more than one hour during
the reference period but who are “available for and actively seeking work”.
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5 Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB),
administered by the Department for Work and Pensions. The LLMDB represents a 1% random
sample of social security records in Great Britain. Individuals covered are those whose National
Insurance numbers end in two given digits. The LLMDB provides a rich set of information on
labor histories of selected individuals from 1978 onwards. In particular, I will use information on
benefit spells and dependent labor income.
The LLMDB provides start and end dates of benefit spells, together with their type. Types
include job-search related benefits, like UB and IS in the old system and JSA in the new system;
health related benefits, like Incapacity Benefits (IB) or the Disability Living Allowance (DLA);
in-work benefits, like the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC); retirement pensions; maternity
allowances; and a few others.
All information on benefit spells is in principle available since 1978, but the quality of benefit
spells data until 1995 is poorer than for the later period. For example, fewer benefit spells seem
to be recorded for the earlier period, and a relatively large proportion of them has missing end
dates, or imputed end dates.
I use unemployment claimants spells for 1996 and 1997. The LLMDB reports 45,982 unem-
ployment benefit spells started by British males between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 1997.
According to the UK Oﬃcial Labour Market Statistics (Nomis), the male unemployment inflow
in the same period was 4,616,199. When LLMDB sampling is taken into account, the figures
stemming from the two sources are closely comparable.
Having said this, even in the post 1995 period, the accuracy of information on end dates of spells
is less accurate than that on start dates. In particular, the IS end dates have very strong quarterly
spikes. This happens because all relevant information about IS spells is collected quarterly by the
Department for Work and Pensions; thus if an individual features in the sample with an ongoing IS
spell at the start of a given quarter, but has disappeared from the sample at the end of the quarter,
he is assigned an imputed completion date corresponding to the middle date of the quarter. As
typically IS spells follow UB spells, this bunching problem is going to produce spikes in the end
dates of unemployment spells in my sample in the pre-JSA regime. For this reason I choose to
minimize the use of the end date of spells in my empirical analysis, and all selection criteria used
are based on spells start dates.
In the pre-JSA regime I construct unemployment spells by linking together UB and IS spells
that (partly) overlap, and UB and IS spells that do not overlap but have a maximum two weeks
window between the end date of the former and the start date of the latter. This is because a spell
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out of benefits of less than two weeks is highly unlikely to represent a short job spell, and thus for
my purpose the corresponding benefit spells sequence best represents a single unemployment spell.
Also, and more importantly, bureaucratic procedures may require some time to move a claimant
from unemployment insurance to unemployment assistance benefits, and this may explain some
short gap between benefit spells. However, my estimation results were not sensitive to shortening
such window to 7 or zero days.
Information on employment and income is provided by fiscal years. Fiscal years in the UK
start on 6 April of a given year and end on 5 April of the following year, and in what follows all
annual indicators reported refer to fiscal, rather than calendar years. Employment and income
are represented by annual weeks worked and annual pre-tax pay, respectively. Both measures
are available from 1978 onwards. However, it should be noted that while from 1999 onwards the
number of weeks worked is reported directly within each National Insurance file, this has been
estimated by the Department for Work and Pensions for the period 1978-1998 using information on
known periods of nonemployment and self-employment. When applied to the post 1999 period, this
methodology reproduces fairly accurately the actual measure of weeks worked available (Needham,
2007).
Income data from the LLMDB have two main shortcomings. First, the LLMDB does not
currently contain employment spells dates, but it reports the number of employment spells recorded
in a given year, so that it is possible to know how many jobs someone has held in a given year,
with the associated weeks worked and pay, but it is not possible to know their start and end dates,
nor their chronological order. This implies that the best measure of wages from this survey is
average weekly wages over a fiscal year.
Second, the LLMDB does not provide information on weekly hours worked. This is mostly
a drawback for the analysis of female wages, given that the incidence of part-time work among
British women was fairly high (around 42% according to the Labour Force Survey) during my
period of observation. Thus I limit my analysis to British males.
Figure 6 display raw data on employment and earnings from the LLMDB between 1978 and
2003. The average number of weeks worked in a year declined steadily in the sample period,
while both annual and weekly earnings increased. Weekly earnings were increasing at an average
rate of 5.8% per year during the sample period, and this corresponds to an average 1.2% real
growth.10 It is worthwhile to notice the blip in annual weeks worked in 1997-1998 and the dip in
annual earnings in 1996. The apparent anomalies could be potentially explained by the fact that
recording methods changed in 1997, and the LLMDB was moved on to a new National Insurance
computerized system. The move from the old to the new system may in part explain the observed
10Using the retail price index from the Oﬃce for National Statistics.
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changes in variables of interest between 1996 and 1997.
6 Methodology and preliminary evidence
In order to assess the long-term eﬀects of JSA exposure on job quality, one needs to take into
account the retroactive nature of the reform, which applied to all unemployment claimant spells
as of 7 October 1996, including those started during the previous UB/IS regime. In particular,
this feature rules out major discontinuities in the relationship between the start date of an un-
employment spell and future outcomes. I will thus choose to compare outcomes for cohorts of
unemployment entrants that are close enough in entry dates to be reasonably similar in aggregate
factors, but far enough to have significantly diﬀerent probabilities of being treated by the JSA.
For a treatment group I use claimant unemployment spells for males aged 16-64, started in the
three months following JSA introduction, and precisely between 7 October 1996 and 5 January
1997. All these spells are subject to the JSA rules. For a control group I use spells started six to
three months before JSA introduction, that is between 8 April and 7 July 1996. These spells are
initially not subject to JSA rules, but eventually become subject if they last beyond 7 October
1996. Thus the distinction between treatment and control is based on diﬀerent intentions to treat.
There are a number of issues to be discussed to understand how good a control group this would
be. First, individuals in the control group are not be treated initially, but become treated if they
last beyond 7 October 1996. Thus the most direct interpretation of the resulting estimates is would
provide the eﬀect of being treated by JSA, as opposed to not being treated in first 3-6 months of
unemployment. But further assumptions would be needed to allow a more general interpretation.
For example, if the treatment probability were randomly distributed among individuals in the
control group, conditional on observable characteristics, then the issue would be simply one of
adequately re-scaling the obtained eﬀect of JSA. For example, in my sample this probability
happens to be almost exactly 50%, and thus the coeﬃcients obtained on these treatment and
control groups should be multiplied by two.
But the probability of being treated in the control group depends on the timing of job finding,
and this is in general aﬀected by unobserved characteristics that define someone’s employability,
such as motivation, ability, search eﬀort etc. If the less-employable are also the less able in the labor
market, individuals who end up being treated in the control group have lower average unobserved
ability. Thus, what matters for the direction of the associated bias is whether the JSA is going to
have a stronger impact on post-unemployment earnings for the more or the less able workers. If
the former is true, the estimated eﬀect of the JSA obtained on these treatment and control groups
overestimates the true eﬀect, once scaling has been taken into account. If the latter is true, as it is
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plausible, one obtains an underestimate of the true eﬀect. My estimates control for detailed past
employment histories, which should act as a good proxy for a number of relevant unobservables
(see Card and Sullivan, 1988). As a robustness check, I will also perform a test solely based on
the short-term unemployed, so that the control group only contains spells that ended before JSA
introduction.
Second, I select control and treatment groups on the timing of job loss, and more precisely, on
the timing of signing-on for unemployment benefits. One may worry about strategic behavior in
the time of signing-on in the presence of anticipatory eﬀects of JSA. And in principle individuals
may try to alter the signing-on behavior in the face of JSA by (i) signing-on earlier than they
would have done without the JSA; (ii) signing-on later; (iii) not signing-on at all. But how likely
is this kind of strategic behavior prior to JSA introduction? It may be argued that trying to
sign-on (shortly) earlier does not avoid treatment, as JSA is retroactive; signing-on later simply
implies loss of unemployment income, thus is clearly not optimal; and finally not signing-on at all
implies again loss of unemployment income: if one really dreads the prospect of the JSA interview
it is optimal to sign-on initially and then not show up for the first JSA interview.
Some indirect evidence on this can be grasped by looking at Figure 7, which gives the number of
claimant unemployment spells started between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 1997, and shows
no sign of any unusual behavior in the unemployment inflow around the time of JSA introduction.
Figure 8 provides a closer snapshot of the two months around JSA introduction. This reveals a
marked weekly pattern in starting dates, with Mondays being by far the busiest days, and the
frequency of new spells declining monotonically during the week, but again there is no evidence
of bunching of new spells shortly before or after 7 October.
It would be interesting to be able to observe the same kind of evidence in the unemployment
outflow, but as alrealy noted in Section 5 the LLMDB data are not ideal for this purpose, due
to heavily bunched ending dates of IS spells, which produce sizeable spikes in the end dates of
claimant unemployment spells, as shown in Figure 9. But oﬃcial labor market data reported in
Figure 1 show no unusual behavior in the unemployment outflow just before JSA introduction,
with a strong fall immediately afterwards.
Finally, treatment and control groups are certainly going to be diﬀerent as far as seasonal
factors are concerned. For this reason I construct treatment and control groups for the same
dates in 1997, and estimate the eﬀect of JSA on future outcomes using a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
approach. I estimate an equation of the form
yi = β0 + β1C
96
i + β2Ti + β3
¡
C96i ∗ Ti
¢
+ γXi + εi (7)
where yi represents an outcome variable, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, C96i is a
15
dummy variable for the 1996 cohort, Ti denotes treatment, and their interaction picks the eﬀect
of JSA. Specification (7) is going to deliver an unbiased estimate for the coeﬃcient of interest, β3,
if
E(εi|C96i = 0, Ti = 0, Xi)−E(εi|C96i = 0, Ti = 1,Xi) =
E(εi|C97i = 0, Ti = 0, Xi)−E(εi|C97i = 0, Ti = 1,Xi).
In other words, as treatment and control groups are selected on the basis of their date of job loss,
the underlying identifying assumption is that the correlation between the timing of job loss and
unobservables, if any, be the same across the two cohorts. This assumption is likely to be violated
if there are strong reasons to expect strategic signing-on timing, but I have argued above that this
is unlikely. Also, it would be worrying if control and treatment had markedly diﬀerent observables
before JSA introduction, and this can be checked by looking at their employment and earnings
histories.
Descriptive statistics for treatment and control groups are reported in Table 1 and Figures
10-13. Table 1 reports information on age and the current unemployment spell. There are around
4,000 spells in each of the groups (treat and control in 1996 and 1997 cohorts). These groups are
very similar in their age, but diﬀer in the duration of their current spell and in its destination. The
control group in the 1996 cohort tends to have longer spells than the three other groups, and this
is the main eﬀect emphasized by the oﬃcial evaluations of the JSA, although not with a diﬀerence
in diﬀerences approach. This group also has a lower probability to experience new benefit spells
in the near future.
More detailed information on annual earnings and weeks worked for the treatment and the
control groups is presented in Figures 10-13. Figure 10 gives the proportion of men with positive
earnings in each year for treatment and control groups in both the 1996 and 1997 cohorts. The
vertical line in correspondence of 1996 represents the introduction of JSA. This coincides with the
reference unemployment spell for the 1996 cohort, while the reference unemployment spell for the
1997 cohort takes place one year later. Overall, the fraction of men with positive earnings rises
for all groups by over 30 percentage points during the 10 years prior to JSA treatment, and this is
mostly an age eﬀect, as the sample is relatively young. After treatment, the trend in such fraction
flattens out or even declines. It is also worthwhile to notice that the proportion with positive
earnings has a spike in the year of treatment, simply telling that the reference unemployment spell
tends to follow in most cases a period of paid employment.
Figure 11 reports the average number of annual weeks worked, conditional on working. In
this case the pre-shock trends are falling, and in particular individuals start experiencing negative
employment shocks around 6 years before the reference unemployment spell. After the JSA shock,
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weeks worked increase, but it seems that part of the increase is due to the 1997-1998 blip in weeks
worked in the main database (see Figure 6). Figures 12 and 13 report log annual and weekly
earnings, respectively. Both measures of earnings decline sharply in the year of job loss, but
otherwise they follow a generally upward trend.
An interesting feature that stands out from Figures 10-13 is that pre-treatment trends are
in general very close for treatment and control groups in both cohorts. More importantly, the
associated diﬀerence in diﬀerences is never significantly diﬀerent from zero for any of the variables
considered in the pre-treatment period. Figures 14-17 plot the diﬀerence in diﬀerences for the
same variables represented in Figures 10-13, where year 0 corresponds to 1996 for the 1996 cohort,
and to 1997 for the 1997 cohort. In Figure 14 a probit version of equation (7) is estimated; while
Figures 15-17 are based on OLS. The solid lines represent the point estimates (and, specifically,
marginal eﬀects in Figure 14), and the dashed lines represent the 90% and 95% confidence intervals,
showing that, for the four labor market indicators considered, all point estimates lie within the
90% interval in the pre-treatment period. Recall that in order to consistently estimate β3 one
needs that any diﬀerence in unobservables between the treatment and control groups be the same
across the two cohorts. Using work histories as a proxy for individual unobservables, the evidence
presented in Figures 14-17 is in line with my identifying assumption.
It should finally be noted that some of the trends in Figures 10-13 seem to diverge after JSA
introduction, and in some cases more for the 1996 than the 1997 cohort, as also shown by point
estimates in Figures 14-17 for the post-treatment period. This is indicative of potential JSA eﬀects
on future outcomes. The next section will provide more detailed results on these eﬀects.
7 Results
7.1 Employment and earnings
I start by presenting evidence on the eﬀects of JSA on the probability of leaving the unemployment
claimant register. Not only was this the main eﬀect emphasized by the oﬃcial evaluations of the
JSA, but also it could be the main channel through which one can expect more long-term eﬀects.
I thus estimate a duration model of exit from unemployment, using a specification analogous
to (7), except that the duration model is non-linear. The results of the Cox proportional hazard
model are presented in the upper panel in Table 2, where the coeﬃcients reported refer to the
interaction between the 1996 cohort and treatment, and thus are supposed to pick the eﬀect of
JSA. All specifications also include separate dummy variables for treatment and the 1996 cohort.
The standard errors are clustered at the individual level, to cater for individuals with multiple
spells in this sample.
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In the regression summarized in column 1, no other regressors are included, and the estimates
show a 10% increase in the unemployment exit hazard as a result of JSA. Column 2 also controls
for age, age squared, and past employment history (i.e. whether the individual had a claimant
unemployment spell in the previous two years, the total number of weeks worked and annual
earnings in each of the previous five years and their square).11 As expected from the evidence
presented in Table 1 and Figures 6-9, the inclusion of covariates hardly aﬀects the results. The
next four columns show results for the young (aged 16-24) and the adult sample (aged 25-64)
separately. The JSA eﬀect is still positive for both groups, but it is stronger for the adult sample,
while it does not reach the standard significance level for the young.
However, as information on ending dates of spells is heavily bunched at quarterly frequencies,
a continuous time duration model is probably not the best way to describe unemployment exit.
Another way to look at the eﬀect of JSA on the outflow from the unemployment register consists
in comparing the fraction of the control group who are still claiming upon JSA introduction, i.e.
on 6 October 1996, with the fraction of the treatment group who, by symmetry, are still claiming
on 6 March 1997, as control and treatment groups are selected as entering unemployment six
months apart. This method has also the advantage of excluding a direct JSA eﬀect on the exit
probability of the control group. The DID results from a probit model are presented in the lower
panel of Table 2, and show again a significant JSA eﬀect on the probability to leave the register,
which is now higher for the young than the adult subsample.
Table 2 thus replicates the main result of the JSA evaluation literature, namely its strong
and significant impact on the exit rate from unemployment. But moving claimants oﬀ benefits
may not be equivalent to moving them on to new jobs. The LLMDB does not allow me to
fully characterize unemployment destinations, because it does not contain information on dates
of employment spells, but I can use information on weeks worked and earnings for the fiscal year
after treatment (and for later years) in order to assess the impact of JSA on both employment
and post-unemployment earnings.
Figures 18-21 present estimates of the eﬀect of JSA on post-unemployment outcomes. Year 1
thus corresponds to 1997 for the 1996 cohort and to 1998 for the 1997 cohort. These estimates
are analogous to the post-treatment estimates presented in Figures 14-17, but unlike in Figures
14-17 they control for a number of observable characteristics, including the pre-treatment trends,
and also they distinguish between the young and the prime-age sample. Figure 18 shows the
eﬀect of JSA on the probability of having positive earnings in the five years after the reference
unemployment spell for the whole sample and for the two age subgroups. JSA implied a reduction
of 4% in the probability of positive earnings in the year after the shock for the whole sample,
11Extending employment and earnings histories 10 instead of 5 years back produced virtually identical results.
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and this eﬀect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The JSA eﬀect is roughly halved in the
second and third year (and it is only significant at the 10% level), and it finally tails oﬀ. For
those aged 16-24 the JSA eﬀect is stronger to start with, and again is reabsorbed within the next
three years. For the prime age subsample the eﬀect is weaker, and becomes non significantly
diﬀerent from zero from the second year onwards. Registering for unemployment benefits soon
after JSA introduction, as opposed to six months earlier, implies thus a significant fall in the future
employment probability, and this eﬀect is fairly long-lived especially for the youths.
Information on the actual number of weeks worked, conditional on having positive earnings,
is presented in Figures 19. The eﬀect of JSA on weeks worked tends to be moderate and is
almost never significant for all age groups. Thus it seems that JSA mostly aﬀected re-entry into
employment, without much of an eﬀect on the number of weeks worked for those who did re-enter
employment.
Figure 20 present evidence on (log) annual earnings. Estimated eﬀects are everywhere negative,
again stronger for the younger subsample, although they are often not significantly diﬀerent from
zero. Figure 21 finally present estimates for weekly earnings, which are the variable most closely
related to post-unemployment job quality in this dataset. While the eﬀect of JSA on weekly
earnings of the older subsample is quite close to zero and never significant throughout the post-
unemployment period, the corresponding eﬀect for the younger sample is negative and significant
in years 2-4 after the shock. It is probably hard to reconcile such decline in weekly earnings with
the direct impact of JSA, because if anything one would expect an immediate eﬀect in the first
year after the reference unemployment spell, which is gradually reabsorbed as individuals who are
initially mismatched search on-the-job for better matches. Some explanation of this behavior may
be related to the employment selection eﬀects of JSA. Figure 18 has shown that the JSA had an
important initial impact on the proportion of individuals in work, which fades gradually over the
next five years, as the treated catch up with the non-treated in their employment levels. Thus the
employment stock may be of relatively high quality among the treated initially, because only the
most able have initially found work, and then quality declines as the less-able among the treated
find work. This selection mechanism may help explain why one does not find a JSA eﬀect initially,
but finds instead a negative eﬀect in the following years.
In summary, the most important eﬀect of JSA on this sample is to reduce the probability to
have positive earnings after an unemployment shock, with more moderate and less precise eﬀects
on the level of both annual and weekly earnings, and with almost no eﬀect on the number of weeks
worked for those who re-enter employment. All eﬀects tend to be stronger and more precisely
estimated for the younger sample. One explanation could be that for youths eligible for UB,
JSA introduction meant both an increase in search requirements, and a reduction in the benefit
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level, with amplified eﬀects on post-unemployment outcomes. But as argued in Section 3 this
explanation is unlikely, as the proportion of individuals eligible for UB only represents a minority
of observations. The other explanation is that the impact of search requirements alone may be
stronger for the youths, and this view seemed to be in line with the introduction of the New Deal
for Young People in April 1998, which combined JSA search requirements with intensive help with
job search (see Van Reenen, 2003).
7.2 Future benefit spells
Previous estimates show that the JSA raised the unemployment outflow, but at the same time also
raised the probability of not working at all in the following year, so one may wonder what happens
to individuals who leave the unemployment register but do not get jobs. One possibility is that
they may apply for and obtain other benefits, which are not conditional on active job search.
To answer this question I use information on diﬀerent types of benefit spells contained in the
LLMDB. The UK welfare system, like most systems, includes several types of benefits, that can
be related to job search, income, health, work etc. For example, during the six months preceding
JSA introduction, between April and September 1996, the LLMDB registers about 77,000 benefit
spells. The most important category among these is represented by unemployment benefits, which
account for about three quarters of ongoing spells. The next category is represented by health-
related benefits, including Incapacity Benefits and the Disability Living Allowance. IB can be
claimed by individuals who are unable to work because of ill health or a disability, and accounts
for about 20% of benefit spells in the pre-JSA period. The DLA is a benefit for individuals who
need personal care due to mental or physical disabilities, and accounts for 10% of spells. Finally
come in-work benefits, represented by the Working Family Tax Credit, which includes just below
4% of benefit spells. One year later, that is between April and September 1997, there are about
63,000 benefit spells in the LLMDB. The importance of unemployment benefits has declined to
about 50%, and that of health-related benefits has increased to 24% for IB, and to 14% for DLA.
In-work benefits have also slightly risen to just over 5%.
To look at the impact of the JSA on unemployment exits into other benefits, I estimate a probit
version of equation (7), where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if an individual is receiving
benefits of any type within 1 month or within 6 months of the end of the reference unemploy-
ment spell, and zero otherwise. I then distinguish between new spells on IB, and new claimant
unemployment spells, whether on JSA, UB or IS. Destinations into other benefit categories are
not separately estimated because they represent a very small minority of my sample (see also
descriptive statistics presented in Table 1).
Table 3 reports results for a one-month window. When controlling for characteristics, individ-
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uals treated by the JSA are on average 3.1% more likely to experience a new benefit spell within
one month of completing their current spell, and this eﬀect is significant at the 5% level. Most of
the impact happens among the younger subsample, in which 4.5% of individuals experience new
benefit spells; while for the older subsample this figure falls to 2.4% and it is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. The positive impact of JSA on exit into new benefit spells is explained in roughly
equal parts by spells on IB and new claimant unemployment spells, although the corresponding
eﬀects only tend to be significant for new spells on IB.
Six months later the situation is more clear-cut, as shown in Table 4. Individuals aﬀected are
3.4% more likely to be benefit recipients. The top panel of Figure 18 above has shown that the
JSA increases by 4.3% the probability of not working in the following year, and the estimates of
Table 4 tell that the bulk of such rise in nonemployment is explained by a higher take-up rate
of new benefits. The same observation holds looking at each age subsample separately. Among
new benefits, the biggest component is represented by IB. This last piece of evidence fits in the
increasing trend in take-up rates of IB in the UK and is consistent with the widespread view that
individuals who had lowest re-employment rates were actually advised by the Employment Service
to apply for IB (see Nickell and Quintini, 2002).
7.3 Robustness tests
The adopted definition of control and treatment groups, as well as some features of the data, require
a number of robustness checks. First, as noted in Figure 2, the unemployment inflow frequency
has a marked weekly pattern, and this may reflect the timing of initial benefit payments, rather
than the date a job loser initially approached the Employment Service. I thus converted the
benefit spells data from daily into weekly, by moving each start date to the previous and following
Mondays in turn, and constructed treatment and control groups in the same way as explained in
Section 6. The estimates obtained on this new sample were virtually identical to those obtained
on the original one.
Second, as treatment and control groups are selected according to their date of job loss for two
consecutive years, one may worry about interactions between seasonal factors and year eﬀects. For
example, if the labor market were in general tighter in the fall (when the treatment is selected) than
in the spring (when the control is selected), and this eﬀect were stronger in 1997 than in 1996, one
could potentially predict poorer lower relative re-employment prospects for the treatment group
in 1996 as a consequence of macroeconomic eﬀects. Evidence on macroeconomic eﬀects can be
provided by the monthly vacancy to unemployment ratio, which is typically used as a measure of
labor market tightness. This ratio increases roughly monotonically in Britain between January
1996 and December 1997, and thus shows no evidence of diﬀerent seasonal patterns in 1996 and
21
1997. As a final check, I repeated the main estimates controlling for the value of labor market
tightness in the month of job loss, and the results stayed largely unchanged.
Fourth, I worked with a sample in which the control group has by definition a zero treatment
probability, by focusing on the short-term unemployed only. That is, I include in the control
group spells started between 8 April and 7 July 1996, and ended before 7 October 1996. None of
these can be treated by the JSA. For symmetry I include in the treatment group spells started
between 7 October 1996 and 5 January 1997, and ended before 7 April 1997, and then repeat
exactly the same procedure for entrants in spring and fall 1997. Of course it must be noted that
the short-term unemployed are a non-random sample of the unemployed population, and also
that the treatment eﬀect needs not be the same across unemployment duration groups. But, in a
benchmark scenario in which the short-term unemployed are a random sample of the unemployed
(conditional on characteristics), and the JSA eﬀect is homogeneous across duration groups (again,
conditional on characteristics), we would expect the estimated JSA eﬀect on this sample to be
twice as large as the one obtained in the original sample, in which the control group in the 1996
cohort turns out to have a 50% treatment probability.
The results on post-unemployment work and earnings for the short-term unemployed are repre-
sented in Figures 22-25, where for simplicity only results on the two age subsamples are reported.
For example, Figure 22 shows that the JSA eﬀect on the probability of positive earnings starts
oﬀ at about 20% for 16-24 year olds, and at about 6.5% for 25-64 year olds. The corresponding
eﬀects for the main sample are 6.3% and 3.8% respectively (middle and bottom panel of Figure
18). Stronger JSA eﬀects than on the main sample are also found in Figures 23-25. In particular,
the JSA impact on annual earnings is now initially significant for both age samples (Figure 24),
and the JSA impact on weekly earnings becomes significant for 25-64 year olds (Figure 25).
Table 5 represents the impact of JSA on exits into new benefit spells within either one or six
months from the completion of the current unemployment spell. Again all eﬀects are stronger
than those reported in Table 3 and 4 for the main sample.
The final robustness test consists in a falsification check, based on treatment and control
groups for 1997 and 1998, constructed in the same way as I previously did for 1996 and 1997.
If my previous estimates identify the eﬀect of JSA, one should obtain no significant eﬀects of an
interaction term between the treatment and the 1997 cohort on this new sample, for any of the
post-unemployment outcomes considered. This is indeed what I obtain, as shown in Figures 26-29
for post-unemployment employment and earnings; and in Table 6 for exits into other benefit spells.
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8 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the post-unemployment eﬀects of higher job search requirements,
exploiting variation provided by the introduction of the UK JSA in October 1996. In a simple job
search framework, one expects that tighter requirements for UI eligibility lower the reservation
wage, with negative consequences on the quality of post-unemployment jobs, and raises the fraction
of non-claimant nonemployed.
Using administrative longitudinal data on spells on unemployment benefits and earnings, I find
that JSA has had a positive and significant impact on the claimant unemployment exit rate, as
well as on exits into other benefits, and a negative and significant impact on the probability of
working in the year after the unemployment spell. Starting a spell soon after JSA introduction, as
opposed to six months earlier, raises the likelihood of a spell on Incapacity Benefits by about 2.5-
3%, and lowers the likelihood of positive earnings by about 4%. At the same time, earnings for the
treated individuals seem to be lower than for the non treated after an unemployment shock, but
the confidence intervals around these estimated eﬀects are quite large to exclude a wider variety
of scenarios. Overall, all the estimated eﬀects tend to be stronger for the 16-24 than the 25-64
years old sample.
A possible interpretation is that tighter search requirements implied by the JSA indeed moved
claimants oﬀ unemployment benefits, without really raising job finding rates. Among claimants
treated by the JSA, those who found jobs quickly did not see their fortunes much changed with
respect to the previous regime, as implied by the absence of significant eﬀects on weeks worked
and earnings in the year following job loss. But those who left the unemployment register without
finding a job were more likely to start spells on benefits that were not search related, and thus
to spend lower search eﬀort and become more detached from the labor market than before the
JSA, with farily long-lasting eﬀects on their employment rates. According to my estimates, the
JSA implied a net loss in (unconditional) weeks worked and earnings with respect to the previous
system during about three years after a job loss.
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Table 1 
Characteristics of treatment and control groups 
 
 Control Treatment 
1996 cohort mean st.d. mean st.d. 
Age  32.5 11.8 33.6 12.1 
Duration of current spell (days) 200.6 304.1 177.1 277.0 
% on new benefit spell within 1 month of completion 0.153  0.190  
Of which:          on new claimant unemployment spell 0.073  0.088  
on incapacity benefits 0.051  0.063  
on other benefits 0.027  0.027  
% on new benefit spell within 6 months of completion 0.455  0.508  
Of which:          on new claimant unemployment spell 0.376  0.406  
on incapacity benefits 0.075  0.096  
on other benefits 0.039  0.044  
Number of spells 4004 4327 
1997 cohort Mean St.d. Mean St.d. 
Age  32.9 11.8 33.5 11.9 
Duration of current spell (days) 174.4 270.6 172.3 263.1 
% on new benefit spell within 1 month of completion 0.202  0.207  
Of which:          on new claimant unemployment spell 0.094  0.098  
on incapacity benefits 0.070  0.067  
on other benefits 0.028  0.028  
% on new benefit spell within 6 months of completion 0.513  0.528  
Of which:          on new claimant unemployment spell 0.406  0.417  
on incapacity benefits 0.104  0.100  
on other benefits 0.041  0.046  
Number of spells 4217 4310 
 
Notes. The sample includes men aged 16-64. Source: LLMDB 
Table 2 
Impact of JSA on claimant outflow 
 
 Cox proportional hazard model 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.099*** 0.106*** 0.063 0.083 0.104*** 0.108*** 
[s.e] [0.031] [0.031] [0.055] [0.054] [0.038] [0.038] 
Observations 16423 16423 5320 5320 11103 11103 
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Whether still claiming at the end of the semester 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 
JSA -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.180*** -0.190*** -0.127*** -0.130*** 
[s.e] [0.014] [0.014] [0.023] [0.023] [0.017] [0.017] 
Observations 16858 16858 5499 5499 11359 11359 
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes. Estimation methods: Cox proportional hazard model in the upper panel and probit model in 
the lower panel (marginal effects reported). JSA=C96*Treat, and regressions also control for 
treatment and C96separately. Other controls included are: age, age squared, whether had an 
unemployment spell in the previous 2 years, total weeks worked in each of the past 5 years and 
their square, total earnings in each of the past 5 years and their square. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level and reported in brackets. 
Table 3 
The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells within 1 month 
 
 Any benefit spell 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.034*** 0.031** 0.048** 0.045** 0.026* 0.024 
(s.e) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
 New claimant unemployment spell  
 Ages 16-64 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.018* 0.016 0.029 0.029 0.013 0.01 
(s.e) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
 Spell of Incapacity Benefits 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.017** 0.015* 0.027** 0.024* 0.011 0.01 
(s.e) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 16858 16858 5499 5499 11359 11359 
Other controls no yes no yes no yes 
 
Notes. The sample includes the 1996 and 1997 cohorts. The outcome variable is 1 if a new benefit 
spell has started within 1 month since the end of the current spell. JSA= C96*treat, and regressions 
also control for treatment and C96 separately. Other controls included are: age, age squared, 
whether had an unemployment spell in the previous 2 years, total weeks worked in each of the 
past 5 years and their square, total earnings in each of the past 5 years and their square. Estimation 
method: probit (marginal effects are reported). Standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
Table 4 
The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells within 6 months 
 
Age sample  16-64  16-24  25-64  16-64  16-24  25-64 
 Any benefit spell 
JSA 0.038** 0.034** 0.045* 0.037 0.034* 0.029 
(s.e) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) 
 New claimant unemployment spell  
JSA 0.020 0.017 0.037 0.031 0.013 0.007 
(s.e) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) 
 Spell of Incapacity Benefits 
JSA 0.027*** 0.024** 0.030** 0.026* 0.025** 0.022* 
(s.e) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
Observations 16858 16858 5499 5499 11359 11359 
Other controls no yes no yes no yes 
 
Notes. The sample includes the 1996 and 1997 cohorts. The outcome variable is 1 if a new benefit 
spell has started within 6 months since the end of the current spell. JSA= C96*treat, and 
regressions also control for treatment and C96 separately. Other controls included are: age, age 
squared, whether had an unemployment spell in the previous 2 years, total weeks worked in each 
of the past 5 years and their square, total earnings in each of the past 5 years and their square. 
Estimation method: probit (marginal effects are reported). Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level 
Table 5 
The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells within 1 month 
Short-term unemployed only 
 
 Any benefit spell 
 Within 1 month Within 6 months 
 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.078*** 0.056*** 0.041 0.038 
(s.e) (0.029) (0.020) (0.035) (0.024) 
 New claimant unemployment spell 
 Within 1 month Within 6 months 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.030 0.019 0.004 0.021 
(s.e) (0.023) (0.015) (0.035) (0.024) 
 Spell of Incapacity benefits 
 Within 1 month Within 6 months 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.048** 0.031** 0.065*** 0.030** 
(s.e) (0.019) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
Observations 3453 6762 3453 6762 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. The sample includes the short-term unemployed from 1996 and 1997 cohorts. Short-term 
unemployed are defined as those who exit unemployment by the beginning of October 
(respectively April) if in the treatment (respectively control) group.  The outcome variable is 1 if a 
new benefit spell has started within 1 or 6 month since the end of the current spell. JSA= 
C96*treat, and regressions also control for treatment and C96 separately. Other controls included 
are: age, age squared, whether had an unemployment spell in the previous 2 years, total weeks 
worked in each of the past 5 years and their square, total earnings in each of the past 5 years and 
their square. Estimation method: probit (marginal effects are reported). Standard errors clustered 
at the individual level. 
Table 6 
The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells 
Falsification test on 1997 and 1998 cohorts 
 
 Any benefit spell 
 Within 1 month Within 6 months 
 Ages 16-24 Ages 25-64 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.030 -0.009 -0.037 -0.008 
(s.e) (0.021) (0.015) (0.027) (0.019) 
 New claimant unemployment spell 
 Within 1 month Within 6 months 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.013 -0.008 -0.040 -0.009 
(s.e) (0.017) (0.011) (0.027) (0.018) 
 Spell of Incapacity benefits 
 Within 1 month Within 6 months 
 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 Ages 16-64 Ages 25-64 
JSA 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.001 
(s.e) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) 
Observations 5366 11303 5366 11303 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. The sample includes the 1997 and 1998 cohorts. The outcome variable is 1 if a new benefit 
spell has started within 1 or 6 month since the end of the current spell. JSA= C97*treat, and 
regressions also control for treatment and C97 separately. Other controls included are: age, age 
squared, whether had an unemployment spell in the previous 2 years, total weeks worked in each 
of the past 5 years and their square, total earnings in each of the past 5 years and their square. 
Estimation method: probit (marginal effects are reported). Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level. 
  
 
Figure 1:  
Flows out of and into the claimant unemployment register 
Data seasonally adjusted. Source: NOMIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  
The claimant unemployment count 
Data seasonally adjusted. Source: NOMIS 
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Figure 3 
Indifference curves between benefit levels and search effort 
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Intended consequences of tighter eligibility requirements 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Unintended consequences of tighter eligibility requirements 
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Figure 6 
Raw employment and earnings time series from the LLMDB 
Sample: males aged 16-64. 
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Figure 7 
Claimant unemployment spells started 1 Jan n1996-31 Dec 1998 
Source: LLMDB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Claimant unemployment spells started 1 Sept -31 Oct 1996 
Source: LLMDB 
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Figure 9 
Claimant unemployment spells ended 1 Jan 1996-31 Dec 1998 
Source: LLMDB 
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Figure 10 
The proportion of individuals with positive earnings in control and treatment groups 
Sample: Males 16-64. Source: LLMDB 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
Average number of weeks worked among the employed in control and treatment groups 
Sample: Males 16-64. Source: LLMDB 
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Figure 12 
Log annual earnings in control and treatment groups 
Sample: Males 16-64. Source: LLMDB 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
Log weekly earnings in control and treatment groups 
Sample: Males 16-64. Source: LLMDB 
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Figure 14 
DID estimates of the probability to have positive earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
DID estimates of the number of weeks worked among the employed 
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Figure 16 
DID estimates of log annual earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
DID estimates of log weekly earnings 
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Notes to Figures 14-17. The solid line represents marginal effects (Figure 14) or coefficients 
(Figures 15-17) on the C96*Treat interaction (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for 
treatment and C96 separately. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Time 
zero denotes 1996 for the 1996 cohort; and 1997 for the 1997 cohort. 
Sample: Males 16-64. Source: LLMDB. 
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Figure 18 
The impact of JSA on the probability of positive earnings 
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Figure 19 
The impact of JSA on the number of weeks worked among the employed 
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Figure 20 
The impact of JSA on log annual earnings 
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Figure 21 
The impact of JSA on log weekly earnings 
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Figure 22 
The impact of JSA on the probability to have positive earnings 
Sample: short-term unemployed 
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Figure 23 
The impact of JSA on the number of weeks worked among the employed 
Sample: short-term unemployed 
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Figure 24 
The impact of JSA on log annual earnings 
Sample: short-term unemployed 
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Figure 25 
The impact of JSA on log weekly earnings 
Sample: short-term unemployed 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes to Figures 22-25. The sample includes the short-term unemployed from 1996 and 1997 
cohorts. Short-term unemployed are defined as those who exit unemployment by the beginning of 
October (respectively April) if in the treatment (respectively control) group. The solid line 
represents marginal effects (Figure 22) or coefficients (Figures 23-25) on to the C96*Treat 
interaction term (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for treatment and C96 separately. 
Other controls included are: age, age squared, whether had an unemployment spell in the previous 
2 years, total weeks worked in each of the past 5 years and their square, total earnings in each of 
the past 5 years and their square. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, 
based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Year 1 denotes 1997 for the 1996 cohort; 
and 1998 for the 1997 cohort. Source: LLMDB. 
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Figure 26 
The impact of JSA on the probability to have positive earnings 
Falsification test on 1997 and 1998 cohorts 
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Figure 27 
The impact of JSA on weeks worked for the employed 
Falsification test on 1997 and 1998 cohorts 
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Figure 28 
The impact of JSA on log annual earnings 
Falsification test on 1997 and 1998 cohorts 
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Figure 29 
The impact of JSA on log weekly earnings 
Falsification test on 1997 and 1998 cohorts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes to Figures 26-29. The sample includes the 1997 and 1998 cohorts. The solid line represents 
marginal effects (Figure 26) or coefficients (Figures 27-29) on to the C97*Treat interaction term 
(see equation (7)), and regressions also control for treatment and C97 separately. Other controls 
included are: age, age squared, whether had an unemployment spell in the previous 2 years, total 
weeks worked in each of the past 5 years and their square, total earnings in each of the past 5 
years and their square. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, based on 
standard errors clustered at the individual level. Year 1 denotes 1998 for the 1997 cohort; and 
1999 for the 1998 cohort. Source: LLMDB. 
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